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Abstract—In this body of work, we are interested in road safety
applications such as advanced driver assistance systems, based
on Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). One of the particular
characteristics of this kind of networks is the continuous sharing
of safety information by its nodes. Since this kind of information
is time sensitive, a node cannot spend much time to verify its
validity with an authority. However, the presence of malicious and
selfish nodes in VANETs corrupts exchanged data, and lowers
the overall data reception ratio in the network. To tackle this, we
propose a new incentive model with exclusion for malicious nodes
called VIME. VIME is inspired from the signaling theory from
economics. It is based on managing a credit count that each node
receives at the initialization of the application. Straightforwardly,
VIME is based on two pillars. On the one hand, a node pays
an appropriate cost for each sent message, which is seen by the
receivers as a guarantee from the source about the truthfulness
of the information. On the other hand, nodes get rewarded for
cooperating in the network. The proposed economic model allows
computing the amounts to be paid and those to be awarded
in order to fight selfish and malicious nodes. We validate our
approach via simulations. We show that VIME is able to detect
and evict gradually all malicious nodes in the network, and
decreases the ratio of corrupted and false sent data until reaching
zero. Moreover, it has a positive impact on the participation of
selfish nodes, as our approach increases the average ratio of sent
data as to equal the ideal case’s percentage, when no selfish node
is present.
I. INTRODUCTION
Road traffic has greatly benefited from the recent network
expansion. As a result, several applications have emerged
having as support Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs).
Communication between vehicles is ad-hoc, using dedicated
short-range communications (DSRC). This type of networks
has several proprieties to take into consideration, such as high
mobility, extended area, and frequent topology changes.
In this paper, we are interested in safety applications,
such as advanced driver assistance systems, built on top of
VANETs, where data related to road traffic is broadcasted.
This kind of applications is usually time-constrained, and
carries important contents whose transmission has to be com-
pletely and trusty achieved. Some solutions like ADCD [1]
and EMPR-PD [2] proposed to increase the data reception
ratio and to reduce the overhead as well as long latency.
Nevertheless, there are still remaining security and truthfulness
issues. A number of attacks are caused by the diffusion of
false information or the removal of an accurate one. There are
two kinds of nodes that can affect the good functioning of
such systems using VANETs. The first kind is the malicious
node. For example, a malicious node can constantly alternate
between bad and good behavior by sharing true and false
information (i.e. to avoid being detected). The second one
is qualified as selfish but rational. It refuses to cooperate by
relaying messages, in order to save its own resources. A large
number of these nodes cause a decrease in the cooperation
in a network, which weakens its connectivity and reduces its
offered services.
The usual solution for establishing a trust metric between
members of a network is a reputation model [3], where mem-
bers are assigned a reputation within a numeric interval. This
allows nodes to have a local view of the network members,
and to share it with their neighbors. A node’s reputation is
negatively affected among its neighbors if a bad behavior
(e.g. sending false information) is detected. However, if the
deployed reputation system is distributed, due to the lack of
infrastructure in the roads, a node can easily be unrecognized
in another area and recover a neutral reputation among its new
neighbors, by simply changing directions. Due to VANET’s
characteristics, such as high mobility, extended deployment
area, and large number of members, the lack of a global
view of the network and its members makes a reputation
model unsuccessful and insufficient for safety applications in
VANETs.
In order to obtain a larger view and make safer exchanges,
we have to impinge resources to nodes, as it is done in credit-
based models [4], [5] and [6]. Unlike a reputation value,
a credit amount does not change because of the mobility
of a particular node, which allows to quickly detect and
evict a malicious node based on this value. These credit-
based solutions focus only on improving nodes’ cooperation.
To tackle these limitations, we propose VIME, a VANET
Incentive Model with Exclusion for malicious nodes, to deal
with both selfish nodes to improve their cooperation, and with
malicious nodes to detect and exclude them from the network.
VIME implements cost and reward functions to handle the
account of each member according to its behavior, thus inciting
nodes to act well. Each node is credited at its first connection
to the network with a fixed amount of credits. For each sent
message, the source pays some cost depending on different
factors, such as the relevance of the information and, the
node’s reputation among its direct neighbors. This represents
a guarantee of trustfulness for the receivers, and an investment
for the source since a corresponding reward will be given to
the node if the shared data is considered as valid. Therefore,
a node can only receive and send messages if it has credits
left, or else it is detected and excluded from the network.
The system described here is similar to the signaling theory
in economics [7], whose main concept is to deal with the
information asymmetry in a market, between customers and
sellers, regarding the quality of the offer. As in a market,
the information asymmetry about the nodes’ behavior in a
network, between message senders and recipients, is caused by
the lack of overview among them, thus inducing the emergence
of malicious nodes. To detect them and to incite selfish nodes
to cooperate, we propose using a signal, which is an amount
with a corresponding cost for the source node, used for each
sent message, to influence the neighbors’ decision about the
message’s validity. To reward good members, some credits
are given to them from their neighbors. This reward depends
on the chosen signal value, and represents an incentive to
cooperate and to continually behave well, as the credit is
used to have access to many privileges in the network such as
receiving neighbors’ messages. If a node runs out of credits,
then it is considered as malicious, and is evicted from the
network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we present some related work in incentive solutions
and their applicability to VANETs. In Section III we present
VIME, our proposed approach. A simulation-based perfor-
mance study is presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V
concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing solutions about cooperation propose to motivate
nodes to forward other’s packets in return for a reward, in
order to minimize the number of selfish nodes. This is the
general concept of incentive methods using cost/reward. The
approach presented in [4] provides a solution using nuggets
as method of payment for the incentive part. A node loads
into its packet a number of nuggets corresponding to an
estimate of the reward for the required intermediate nodes in
order to reach the destination node. The main limitation of
this method is the reward estimation since, in both cases of
underestimation and overestimation, a part of the nuggets is
lost. A second scheme presented in [4] is the packet Trade
Model. It uses a negotiation between intermediate nodes, such
that an intermediate node buys a packet and sells it to the
next node in such a way that it will make a benefit. But
the destination node, being the last receiver, supports all the
forwarding costs.
In [5], authors propose rules for the nodes to choose their
degree of cooperation within the network according to the
node’s amount of nuggets. This method requires nodes to
cooperate quantitatively, which does not always ensure a
constant cooperation over time. Our system differs in the
effort required by a node for cooperation. Reputations are
frequently updated and their value have a great impact on
the costs and the rewards for sending messages. This incites
nodes to cooperate well and regularly, especially since a good
reputation greatly reduces the cost of sending messages.
Another incentive solution proposed in [9], introduces a
sweepstakes component to enhance more nodes’ collaboration.
The authors incite intermediate nodes by proposing them
weighted rewards, in addition to a fixed reward to one of them,
chosen probabilistically. This solution depends on the exis-
tence of infrastructures, responsible of the rewarding and the
reception of nodes’ receipts about their cooperation actions.
Nevertheless, this solution does not deal with the presence of
malicious nodes.
Another approach presented in [6] proposes an incentive
model for mobile nodes using infrastructures as a Credit
Clearance Service (CCS). Each node has to keep a receipt
of its actions in the network. Hence, upon verification by the
CCS, it receives a reward. The main drawback of this solution
is the multiple verifications to ensure a correct functioning of
the whole chain. It introduces a lot of latency and overhead
which do not guarantee the scalability in VANET. In [8], au-
thors propose to use an identity-based cryptosystem, to allow
network authorities to handle misbehaved nodes. This solution
needs traceability information about nodes, obtained with the
deployment of roadside infrastructures and law enforcement
authorities. However, we argue that solutions are more scalable
and heterogeneous if their operations do not depend on an
infrastructure, which is the case of our approach, VIME.
Most existing incentive models do not deal with message
diffusion. Moreover, regarding unicast, some solutions rely
on estimation of rewards, which is not a useful parameter in
VANETs as routes change very often; or they use a constant
price for the reward, which does not always represent an
incentive for the nodes. Others aim at solving either the
selfish nodes problem or the malicious node problem. In our
case, we believe that both should be handled at the same
time. Considering these limitations, our work uses different
parameters to calculate a fitted price so that each node is
a winner while applying our mechanism. Moreover, it links
an incentive and an exclusion module to eradicate malicious
nodes and motivate selfish ones.
III. VIME: A VANET INCENTIVE MODEL WITH
EXCLUSION FOR MALICIOUS NODES
VIME is a novel approach to ensure the truthfulness of
shared information and handle high mobility in VANETs.
It uses a credit management system to eradicate dishonest
nodes, and to increase the participation of selfish nodes.
VIME implies that each node has a unique identification in
the network, and a tamper-proof credit count [10], which is
credited initially with a fixed value. A node uses its credit
for two cases. The first one is for sending a message and
the second one, is for rewarding a neighbor about a shared
information if it considers the content as well as the paid cost
of sending it as valid. The enrichment or impoverishment of a
node are related to its behavior and its degree of cooperation
in the network.
A. Credit Management Functions
1) Sending Cost: According to the market strategy, a source
node takes on the role of a service provider that must offer a
guarantee about its products to its customers. This guarantee
depends on many parameters such as the source node’s reputa-
tion, a standard cost set by the application, and the importance
of the data. A guarantee cost for a message is individual and
differs for the same information, even between the source node
and the relayed node for this message. In our environment, this
guarantee is translated into a cost called Csti(N(i)) used to
diffuse a message from node i to its neighbors N(i). This
cost has to be substantial for the source node according to
its initial amount of credits given at its first connection to
the network, init_credit. It also has to be consistent with
respect to the importance of the shared information, i_msg,
set on a range of 0 to 1 as discussed in [1]. Finally, it has
to meet at the same time all of the neighbors’ expectations in
terms of guarantee, so that the receivers consider and accept
the message. The source node pays a cost as computed in
equation (1) by decrementing its credit count via a tamper-
proof counter.
Csti(N(i)) =
init_credit
G
× i_msg × (2−Rti(i)) (1)
A parameter G is used for the cost calculation. It divides
the initial credit that a node receives, in order to establish
a reference value for message costs. G allows to increase and
to decrease the number of sent messages whose cost is paid
only with the initial credit. Using a small value for G, allows
quickly depleting a malicious node’s credit count (e.g. in case
of no rewards), thus making it unable to participate in the
network. Using a large value for G allows the unknown nodes,
for example, to have more chances of sharing their messages
in order to increase their reputation among their neighbors,
especially in the case of low density and high mobility. The
second parameter of the equation, i_msg, is about the diffused
data relevance. Indeed, the more the data is important, the
more there is consequences if it is corrupted. Therefore there
is a correlation between it and the cost.
The third parameter is Ri(i) (i.e. a reputation about the
node i held by itself at time t), based on the received
reputations from its neighbors about it. The reputation values
are computed as described in [11], these values are continuous
and belong to the [−1, 1] range. Ri(i) represents a personal
and momentary estimation of the node’s reputation among its
current neighbors. Hence, the cost is also dependent on the
reputation of the source among its neighbors, which are the
receivers and the decision-makers about the truthfulness of the
data. The receivers check if the paid cost corresponds to the
message and their estimations of it, and then check the validity.
A reputation makes the cost more or less expensive in order
to offer a greater guarantee, especially when the reputation is
bad. To meet the receivers’ expected guarantees, and to receive
rewards from them, a source node has to be able to know or
estimate its reputation among them.
2) Reputation Relevance for the Reward: VIME uses a
function for the reputation relevance, W(Rti(j)). It assigns a
weight to Rti(j), the reputation value of a sender/forwarder
node j computed by a receiver node i at time t. This weight
is used for the reward estimation. It allows higher rewards
for high reputation nodes compared to lower reputation nodes
for the same action, thus inciting nodes to maintain good
reputations.
W(Rti(j)) is computed with equation (2), where a hyper-
bolic tangent is used because of its characteristics, namely
its behavior that closely resembles that of an exponential
function for both positive and negative values. The tanh result
is multiplied with a factor in order to obtain results in [−1, 1]
range.
W (Rti(j)) = tanh(R
t
i(j))×
e2 + 1
e2 − 1
(2)
3) Reward Value Computation: At the reception of a mes-
sage, a node checks the cost paid by the source. To do that, the
receiver calculates a range of tolerated paid cost for the sent
message, [Csti(j)min, Cs
t
i(j)max] as described in equation
(3). This is performed in order to cope with information
asymmetry in the network, i.e. in case of divergence about
the reputations of each node, which may be caused by the
node’s mobility and topology changes.{
Csti(i)min=
init_credit
G
×i_msg×(2−max(RtN(j)(i))),
Csti(i)max=
init_credit
G
×i_msg×(2−min(RtN(j)(i))),
(3)
The minimum boundary of this range is set to maintain a
mandatory guarantee for the message. The maximum boundary
is to prevent any abuse from malicious nodes. For example,
they could use a greater cost for the only trusted information
that they send in order to obtain a greater reward corresponding
to their paid cost, thus sharply increasing their credit count.
The minimum cost calculated by a receiver node j is based
on the maximum held reputation of the source node attributed
by it or received from its neighbors N(j), and vice versa for
the maximum cost.
The reward’s aim is to make sure that the system remains
incentive for the good nodes and dissuading for the malicious
one. Moreover, it represents a cost to receive information. This
decreases nodes’ credit count when rewarding source nodes.
Furthermore, in order to earn credits, and reward received
messages, selfish nodes are encouraged to cooperate.
When the cost paid by a source node for its message lives up
to the receiver’s expected guarantee, the receiver examines the
message and decides about its confidence on the data. If the
receiver considers the message as valid, it rewards the source
node by sending to it some credit via its tamper-proof credit
count. The amount depends on the cost paid by the source, the
density around it, which correspond to the potential rewarder
nodes, and the held reputation value about the source node.
The reward Rewtj(i) from a node j to a node i at time t, is
then calculated as follows in equation (4).
Rewtj(i) =
(W (Rtj(i)) + 1)× Cs
t
i(N(i))
|N(j)|
(4)
Fig. 1. Message Exchanges Using TPM
A reward, Rew, is estimated according to a weight , W , given
to the source node’s reputation, Rti(j), in order to provide
higher remunerations to the nodes with greater reputation
values, and to delay the credit count increase of the less
reputed ones. For nodes with average reputation, their reward
only recovers their paid cost, Csti, for the message, so there
is no loss and no profit for them. However, their reputation
can increase which promises them a weighty gain later. To
maintain consistency, the reward value depends also on the
cost paid by the source, and on the number of neighbors,
N(i), which are supposed to reward the source. In order for
a reward to be divided among them, even if the estimation of
each one of them differs because of asynchronous information,
an approximate reward can be reached, ensuring a certain level
of coherence for the reward of the source node.
B. Tamper-Proof Credit Count
To guarantee a smooth functioning for VIME, we assume
that each node has a Trusted Platform Module [10], TPM,
which is a secure piece of hardware with cryptographic
capabilities, able to implement elliptic curves in order to
generate keys according to the IEEE 1609.2 Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm [12], and to store data in shielded
locations. To guarantee its security and integrity, the TPM
stores a fingerprint of the application, which leads to detect
any change by an attacker.
TPM is frequently used to build secure architectures for
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks [13]. In our case, the TPM is used
to manage a tamper-proof credit1. The security requirements
of our solution are about trustworthiness of paid costs, which
aims at deducing the paid sum from the node’s account,
and updating its credit amount, while supporting large-scale
deployment. To do this, TPM encrypts the signaling cost and
reward, and stores the credit account into its shielded storage.
The use of a TPM allows VIME to be distributed, and not
based on the presence of any infrastructure. Fig. 1 illustrates
the message exchange for either new captured information
or forwarded messages, between nodes A and B using their
1The TPM is not exclusive to VIME. It can also be used by other
applications and for other purposes
Fig. 2. VIME process
TPM (TPMA and TPMB , respectively). Firstly, node A
updates its own reputation, RTA(A), using its neighbor’s shared
impressions about it. This value is added to the data to share,
and is sent to TPMA as MsgA, in order to calculate the
corresponding cost, CstA, using equation (1). Then, TPMA
returns a signed message MA to node A, which is the cost
added to the data encryption including a timestamp, by using
its private key pk. A will then broadcast MA to its neighbors.
In our example, node B is a neighbor of A and receives
MA. Foremost, node B asks its TPM about the used cost
by A and compares it to the reputation that it holds about
it. If the two values are coherent, according to equation (3),
and if node B holds no information that would cast doubt on
the veracity of the received data, (e.g. a too bad reputation
of the source, or an incoherence in the timestamps and the
localization of the event as discussed in [14]), then node B
accepts the information, and therefore has to reward node A.
Then, TPMB decrypts the data and returns it to node B, and
subtracts a corresponding reward for node A according to its
deployed cost and its reputation, using equation (4). Finally, it
returns the new message, containing the signed reward value
to node B, which is sent subsequently to node A, in order that
its TPM increases its credit count. Thereafter, the reputation
of the two nodes can be updated. A’s reputation is updated
because of the validity of its sent data, and B’s reputation is
updated for the cooperation by sending it a reward.
To avoid frauds, the calculations of the cost and the reward
are made and signed by the TPM, which adds or subtracts
immediately this value from the credit account.
C. Example of VIME’s Operations
Fig. 2 illustrates the workings of VIME. Vehicles are able to
send messages after paying a cost, calculated using equation
(1). According to their reputation, vehicle A should pay 6,
and vehicle C 8, 5 when init_credit is 100, G parameter
is 20, and i_msg is 1. The transaction is secured using the
TPM of the sending node, which authenticates the subtraction
from its credit count. Vehicle E pays more than vehicle C,
which in turn pays more than vehicle A because of their
different reputations. When credits are insufficient to pay the
corresponding cost, as in the case of vehicle D, a node cannot
send its message, and when its credit is exhausted, it is evicted
from the application and considered as malicious.
As sent messages are encrypted, a receiver has to choose
to accept it or to refuse it beforehand. Therefore, at each
message reception, nodes verify if the cost paid by the source
is coherent with equation (3). Once this verification is done,
a node informs its TPM about its decision, and if it considers
the data as valid, then the TPM decrypts it and delivers it
to the node, while computing a reward for the source node,
using equation (4) (e.g. vehicle B rewards A with 2.24, E with
1.62, and C with 2.37). Finally, the TPM deducts the reward
from the credit count of the receiver. As for the sending node,
the reward process is secured by the TPM of the receiving
nodes. By performing this entire procedure, VIME encourages
cooperation among nodes, and aims at automatically selecting
good members in the network by proposing them interesting
rewards and low costs (e.g. vehicle A earns after deducting
its sending cost 6.7 in the case where the five neighbors
participate in the reward process, while vehicle C earns 3.35,
and E loses 2.9. Credit counts of the other vehicles diminish
during the reward process, because of the reward they pay
to remain informed. Conversely, they will earn credits when
sending correct data. Indeed, to be able to be informed at all
times, nodes have to always posses enough credits to decrypt
the received messages. This is possible provided that a node
cooperates and behaves well, which incites selfish nodes to
cooperate more.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of our model by analyzing
its effectiveness on detecting malicious nodes and inciting
selfish nodes to cooperate, in order to improve the received
ratio of truthful data and decrease that of corrupted data. We
conducted a set of simulations using NS2 [15] for 100 nodes
moving in a 5 kilometer highway, making round trips and
some stops at both ends, according to a mobility scenario
with a velocity in the range of 90 − 160 km/h during 3600
seconds, such as an event is detected and transmitted each one
second. We used VanetMobiSim [16] as vehicular mobility
model. The simulated radio transmission range is 250 meters,
using IEEE 802.11 as the MAC layer protocol. We use
ADCD [1] to optimize the diffusion of data and to minimize
the communication overhead.
During the simulation, we introduce different ratios of
malicious and selfish nodes to evaluate their effects on the
network, and how much our solution remedies to that. For
our evaluation, we selected the three following performance
metrics:
• Percentage of detected nodes: Either malicious nodes or
false positives (non-malicious nodes detected as mali-
cious).
• Average ratio of corrupted data: Measures the impact of
malicious nodes on the network.
• Average ratio of received data: Measures the impact of
selfish nodes on the network.
In our scenario, a malicious node always sends false data and,
during the forwarding of a received message, it corrupts the
data before retransmitting it. On the other hand, a selfish node
is rational. It cooperates and forwards others’ messages when
it requires credits to provide for its own needs. For these
simulations, we set the threshold of needed credits for a selfish
node to the half of the initial credits received in the beginning,
fixed to 1150 during the simulation.
First, we studied the detection percentage of malicious
nodes, and the percentage of false positives in a network
composed of 16% and 25% of malicious nodes. Results are
presented in Fig 3. We can evidence that the percentage of
malicious node detection gradually increases, which occurs
when they run out of credit. By the end of our simulated time,
100% of the total number of malicious nodes in the network
have been detected and then removed from the network
application. Moreover, the percentage of false positives, which
is the percentage of good nodes detected as malicious, does
not exceed 4% in both cases.
By analyzing in detail the simulation results, we found out
that nodes that have been mistakingly evicted are those who
send/forward very few packets (between 10 and 20 packets
during the simulation time), compared to the number of
packets they receive. In comparison, other nodes send/forward
five to ten times more packets (around 100 packets). These
"false positive" nodes are forwarding less packets, not because
they behave selfishly, but because of the use of ADCD [1].
Indeed, due to ADCD’s optimizations with the identification of
target areas to the broadcasting strategy, according to the data
importance in order to avoid overhead, some nodes that are in
the boundary of the diffusion zone often consume packets (i.e.
send rewards), but do not forward them (i.e. do not receive
rewards). One possible solution for reducing the number of
false positive exclusions is to have a threshold under which
a node in the boundary of the diffusion zone (i.e. the last
one to receive the packet) will not accept any packet as it
will not be able to forward them and thus get rewarded.
Even though this solution will decrease the performance of
the diffusion approach, it allows avoiding the false positive
exclusions. This feature can be tied to message priority. High
priority messages will always be accepted, while low priority
ones can be rejected.
The second studied metric is the average ratio of corrupted
data sent through the network during the simulation time.
Since a new event is detected every second and sent using the
target diffusion protocol, ADCD, the aim is to only deliver the
data to the concerned vehicles. In the case where a malicious
node sends a false data or a corrupted one about a truthful
previous one, a receiver well-behaving node may not detect
this immediately and may thus retransmit the false data, which
increases the amount of false data in the network. Therefore, it
is important to rapidly detect and remove the malicious nodes
from the network. Fig.4 shows the average ratio of corrupted
and false sent data in a network with different percentages of
malicious nodes: 16% and 25%. We compare the performance
of VIME with a network not using any solution, and network
using MEB_Trust, a majority based and experience based trust
algorithm adapted from [17], where a node always asks its
neighbors about the validity of a received message before
accepting it. Feature of our solution decreases this ratio until
Fig. 3. Percentage of detected nodes, malicious and false positives for a
network with 16% and 25% of malicious node.
Fig. 4. Average ratio of corrupted data for a network with 16% and 25%
of malicious node.
Fig. 5. Average ratio of received data for a network with 0%, 16% and 25%
of selfish nodes.
reaching 0 after 3600s in both studied cases. The decrease
of the received ratio of corrupted data is due to the detection
and eradication of the malicious nodes. Unlike MEB_Trust,
which does not eradicate malicious nodes from the network.
The third metric, represented in Fig.5, shows the effectiveness
of inciting selfish nodes to cooperate in the network. Different
compositions of networks are made, with 0%, 16% and 25%
of selfish nodes. The case where there are 0% of selfish nodes
represents the ideal case. Note that after 2000s of simulation
time, the ratio of received data in networks with 16% and
25% of selfish nodes using our incentive model is close to the
ideal case, which proves the effectiveness of our approach in
creating the need for selfish nodes of having credit, and thus
increasing their cooperation in the network.
Furthermore, the generated messages using our solution do
not interfere on the scalability of the network. Indeed, as our
solution aims primarily at chiefly ensuring safety information,
which generally occurs at sparse times and areas, the generated
traffic is not continuous.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose VIME, an incentive model with
exclusion for malicious nodes, inspired from signaling theory
from economics. It is based on the management of an initial
credit, that each node receives at the initialization of the
application. VIME is an effective solution to cope with both
malicious and selfish nodes in VANETs, without requiring the
deployment of any infrastructure.It detects and evicts mali-
cious nodes from the network when they have no more credits
left. Furthermore, it incites selfish nodes to cooperate more by
proposing interesting rewards. We showed via simulations that
VIME detects gradually all malicious nodes in the network,
while at the same time decreasing the ratio of corrupted and
false sent data. Our solution also increases the participation of
selfish nodes in a network, as to equal the percentage of the
ideal case, with no selfish nodes in the network.
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